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Abstract 
 
The relationship between income and subjective well-being (SWB) is investigated 
using eight waves of the British Household Panel Survey and an estimation strategy that 
allows us to relax some assumptions typically made in the literature. First, we use a 
random effects generalized ordered probit model to investigate whether income effects 
are heterogeneous across SWB categories, and, second, we discretise (absolute and 
relative) income variables to allow for the income effects to vary across income groups. 
We find that higher absolute income increases SWB but up to a certain level, while low 
income is significantly correlated with low scores in the SWB ladder. Our results are 
consistent with the Easterlin Paradox that has been reported in the literature. We find that 
high-income groups are less likely to belong in the highest SWB level, which could be 
partly explained by the fact that the relative income status (rather than the absolute one) 
is more important in determining (the highest level of) SWB. 
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1. Introduction  
 
A large and growing empirical literature in economics is focused on understanding 
the determinants of individual well-being using happiness or subjective well-being
2,3
 
(SWB) functions (for recent reviews see Frey and Stutzer 2002; Frey and Stutzer, 2005; 
Di Tella and MacCullogh, 2006, Clark et al., 2008). Since the early stages, the 
relationship that attracted the attention of economists was the one between income and 
happiness, which also bore important policy implications. The level of consumption 
associated with a positive level of income is often taken as one of the main components 
in the utility function and measures of individual and national income have been taken as 
proxies for the health of individual and societal growth over time (see a critic overview of 
these concepts in England (1988) and for a more general and macroeconomic standpoint 
see Boskin (2000) and Nordhaus (2000)).  
In a similar fashion we continue to address the same relationship between income 
and happiness by combining two different strands of the current literature. On one hand, 
comparison and adaptation effects are incorporated into the analysis, by including self-
perceived financial situation, while controlling for absolute income (and accounting for 
potential problems of endogeneity). On the other hand, we explore income heterogeneity 
in SWB across outcome categories and income groups, to test, among other things, 
whether the effects typically found in the literature (i.e., slightly positive effects on 
happiness) are insensitive to individual’s income level.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the background and previous 
literature, while it introduces in greater detail the contributions of the current paper. 
Section 3 presents the econometric methodology and Section 4 the data used in the 
analysis and the transformation of the variables. Section 5 presents the estimation results 
and Section 6 discussed them, while the Section 7 concludes with a summary of the 
findings and thoughts for further research. 
                                               
2 As is common in the literature, the terms happiness and subjective well-being are used interchangeably. 
3 The latent SWB is typically measured as a categorical variable derived directly from questions such as: 
“How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your life overall”, with a number of possible outcomes ranging 
from ‘not satisfied’ to ‘completely satisfied’. 
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2. Background and motivation 
 
The discussion behind the income-happiness relation is, to a large extent, driven by 
the so-called ‘Easterlin Paradox’ (Easterlin, 1974; Easterlin, 1995), which lies in the fact 
that within a country, at a given time, those with higher incomes are, on average, happier, 
while over time and in the long run, despite increases in income in developed countries, 
the average level of happiness has not increased significantly.
4
 In, Easterlin’s words, 
raising the income of all does not increase the happiness of all (Easterlin, 1995). Similar 
findings have been observed even more recently by Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) for 
the UK and the USA. Attempts to understand the Easterlin Paradox have put forward 
hypotheses related to hedonic adaptation, aspiration, comparison effects
 
and time-use 
shift as very important determinants of well-being that should be included in the SWB 
regression.  
Hedonic adaptation implies that perceived well-being can adapt to material goods 
over time at the same rate as income increase, thus, even if additional material goods 
provide initial pleasure, their effects wear out over time. Hence, people get used to their 
consumption and income levels (Scitovsky 1976; Easterlin 1974 and 1995). Similarly, 
aspiration or expectation effects relate to the fact that over the years the positive effects 
of increased income disappear as individuals adjust their aspirations accordingly 
(Easterlin, 2001; Stutzer, 2004; van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004). Comparison 
effects suggest that in evaluating their financial situation, individuals compare themselves 
to their peers; as a result absolute income increases could be virtually cancelled out by 
comparison effects (Van de Stadt et al., 1985; Clark and Oswald, 1996; McBride, 2001; 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Vendrik and Woltjer, 2007). Therefore, it might be the 
difference between one’s earnings and his/her peers (relative income) that can explain 
                                               
4 The most common examples are that of U.S.A. and Japan. During the period 1972-1991 US real GDP per 
capita more than doubled, yet levels of happiness remained constant. Similarly, Japan experienced a 
constant and stable economic growth, from the end of 1950s to the end of 1990s, with GDP per capita 
increasing five-folds, while there was no increase in the long run level in SWB. Almost the same 
conclusions hold for countries in Europe (Clark et al, 2008) 
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SWB more precisely, rather than comparisons of absolute income. In general, relative 
income is evaluated as the average income of a reference group, defined exogenously by 
the researchers based on several criteria (e.g. region, age, education and gender), while 
whom individuals really compare themselves to remains unknown. Thus, a subjective 
element in defining relative income is introduced, as the researcher has to speculate about 
one’s reference group.  
Finally, Kahneman and his colleagues put forward another interesting interpretation 
related to time-use shifts. Rises in income often shift an individual's time use towards 
activities associated with a deterioration in SWB. The activities in which wealthier 
people spend relatively more of their time are associated, on average, with slightly higher 
tension and stress (Kahneman et al., 2006)
5
.  
Moving away from the Easterlin paradox, a part of the literature is devoted in 
exploring how income affects happiness among different groups suggesting that the slope 
of the happiness-income relationship might vary (Frijters et al 2004a; Lelkes, 2006; Clark 
et al 2005). Clark et al. (2005) investigate slope heterogeneity using a latent class 
approach. Identifying the optimal number of latent groups and the probability of 
belonging to each latent class for each individual, they estimate the parameters of interest 
for each latent class, where significantly different marginal effects of income on SWB 
were found for each class. Furthermore, in two working papers, Boes and Winkelmann 
(2004, 2006a) allow the coefficient of income to vary across the response categories and 
find that lower SWB levels are positively affected by income while a negative effect is 
reported for the highest SWB levels suggesting that “income buys happiness up to a 
certain level”(Boes and Winkelmann, 2004, p. 2). 
Recent studies based on longitudinal samples, allow for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity by including individual nuisance parameters (such as personality traits and 
reference scale bias), arguing for a positive relation between income and happiness 
(Kahneman et al., 2006). Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) used a fixed effects logit 
                                               
5 Time-shifts towards less enjoyable activities are explained by the failure in anticipating the effect of some 
activities on life satisfaction which is called focusing illusion by Kahnemann et al. (2006). A focusing 
illusion occurs when people concentrate on the influence of any single factor on their global well-being and 
exaggerate its importance relative to factors contributing to moment-to-moment happiness. 
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model collapsing the SWB categories into a binary indicator of ‘unhappy’ and ‘happy’ 
people. Similarly, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), keeping then the ordinal nature 
of the SWB variables, estimate a fixed effects ordered logit model, while Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2005) made use of a random effects ordered probit model allowing for some 
correlation between the individual characteristics and the observable variables.  
Furthermore, a number of studies have been able to utilise exogenous variations in 
income to more firmly establish the causal and positive link between income and 
happiness (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2001; Frijters et al., 2004a, 2004b; Senik, 2004; 
Gardner and Oswald, 2006; Kahnemann et al., 2006). Gardner and Oswald (2006) 
compare individuals who won at the lottery with two control groups using a longitudinal 
data of British people and found that the unexpected increase in income had a positive 
effect on their mental health. Frijters et al (2004a; 2004b) found that 35-40% of the 
increase in SWB in East Germans is due to the exogenous increase in real household 
income after the reunification of the country in 1991.  
As argued in Section 1, the objective of this paper is to combine the literature on 
comparison, adaptation and expectation effects (used to explain the Easterlin Paradox) 
with the investigation of heterogeneity in SWB across for the British population, using 
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The novelty of our approach lies in the 
methodology used that allows us to test for the importance of income on SWB in UK by  
relaxing several assumptions implicitly made when modelling the relationship between 
SWB and income.  
First, apart from absolute income, we include in our estimations an original concept 
of ‘relative income’ based on the respondent’s perceived financial status, which we 
assume to be a synthetic indicator that includes adaptation and comparison effects. As 
previously mentioned, happiness studies assess relative or comparison income effects on 
happiness by assigning a reference group to every individual, where these reference 
groups are defined in terms of age, education and possibly region and are common across 
the sample (see for example Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). Arguably the choice of the 
reference group is arbitrary. There are other unobserved factors that influence what the 
individuals would consider as their reference group rendering impossible to evaluate the 
criteria used to build these reference groups. We argue that respondents are the best 
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judges of their own situation and that in the absence of information about each 
individual’s reference group, a subjective assessment of financial status (or situation) by 
each respondent might incorporate more efficiently how individuals evaluate their 
household income relative to their “true” reference group. In sum, rather than imposing 
the common criteria for the choice of reference group, we allow respondents’ perception 
of their financial situation to be the indicator of their relative income. Moreover, 
subjective perception of financial situation includes an evaluation of the respondent’s 
current income with respect to his past circumstances and aspirations. Our notion of 
relative income is linked to the theoretically and empirically well-grounded concept for 
individual’s aspirations, where individual welfare functions are constructed by asking the 
respondents to evaluate different levels of income as ‘bad’, ‘good’, etc. (van Praag, 1971, 
1993). In answering the ‘income evaluation question’, they should take into account their 
own situation with respect to their past and peers.  
Second, we focus on analysing the slope heterogeneity of the happiness-income 
relationship (Boes and Winkelmann 2004; 2006a; 2006b; Clark et al., 2005), which 
implies allowing individual utility function to differ across individuals (Tinbergen, 1991; 
Sen, 1992). Specifically, studies (Huppert and Whittington, 2003) have shown a degree 
of independence in the determinants of positive and negative well-being, indicating that 
ill-being and well-being are two distinct dimensions and not opposite ends of the same 
scale (p.S24, Headey and Wooden, 2004). Hence, though, the ordinal nature of the SWB 
variables is maintained the implicit assumption of the traditional ordered response models 
of homogeneity of the regressors’ effects for each level of subjective well-being is 
relaxed. We test for the importance of income effects allowing for flexible estimated 
parameters across the distribution of the outcome variable, which could provide 
interesting insights in the income-happiness relationship. This specification possesses 
several advantages when compared to the specifications typically used in the literature as 
it enhances greatly the flexibility and the amount of information that can be extracted 
from the data, as well as allowing for the computation of marginal effects, easing the 
interpretation of the parameters for nonlinear models. In particular, contrary to the 
standard ordered probit, the marginal effects for the generalised ordered probit are not 
constrained to switch sign exactly once, when moving from the lowest to the highest 
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SWB category, but the effects are freely determined by the model (Winkelmann and 
Boes, 2006). 
Third, we test if our findings hold when considering heterogeneous groups of 
people. We introduce (absolute and relative) income as categorical variables allowing for 
different effects to be observed across income groups and also relaxing any aprioristic 
linear functional form assumption. This specification permits testing whether the 
direction and magnitude of income effects on the different level of happiness are similar 
across poor and rich (i.e., whether poor and rich react alike to income changes) and 
whether the conclusions of the current literature regarding the existence of both absolute 
and relative income effects hold for different segments of the income distribution.  
Fourth, we reduce the problem of potential endogeneity. As mentioned previously, 
there are few studies (Frijters et al., 2004a; 2004b; Gardner and Oswald, 2006) 
adequately addressing this issue in the SWB literature. However, in doing so, they focus 
on sub-samples of the population (i.e., lottery winners) and their results cannot be 
adopted and generalised when the main interest lies in the income-happiness relationship 
in the general population. In order to account for endogeneity, we make use of the panel 
structure of our dataset and introduce in the models the lagged values of the suspected 
endogenous variables (employment status and health conditions), treating them as 
predetermined.  
 
3. Methods  
 
The nature of our dependent variable (SWB with 6 ordered outcomes) compels us 
to employ ordered response models for our modelling purposes. By assuming that 
happiness is a linear function of certain variables, the model to be estimated is of the 
form:  
 
itiitit xy  
*                                                                                                    (1) 
yit=j   if      jity  
*
1-j ,      for  j=1,…,J                                                    (2) 
 
 8 
where, i=1,…,n and t=1,…,T denoting individuals and time, respectively. *ity  reveals the 
latent process of happiness and it is linked to the observed outcome ity , given by the 
SWB question, as presented in equation 2. i , is the time invariant individual parameter 
assumed to be uncorrelated with any of the regressors (something that will be relaxed 
later on), and εit is the normally distributed random error assumed to be strictly 
exogenous, capturing the unobserved heterogeneity for happiness. The vector itx  includes 
all the variables of interest while it is assumed to be exogenous conditional on i . Finally, 
as said previously we only observe ity , which takes the discrete values j = 1,…,6, where 
the cut-off points ( j ) need to be estimated along with the rest of the parameters.  
Following from the equations (1) and (2), the predicted probability for the ordered 
probit conditioning on i is 
 
)()(),|Pr( 1j iitjiitiitit xxxjy                                      (3)                       
 
where 0 and J  with 0)( 0    and 1)(  J , while denotes the standard 
normal cumulative function where without loss of generality the variance is equal to 1.  
However, the random effects ordered probit model presented above, although it 
takes into account the repeated observations and the heterogeneity unobserved to the 
researcher, it has a fundamental limitation. The assumption of the model, referred to as 
single crossing property, requires that as we move from the probability of the smallest 
outcome to the probability of the largest outcome, the marginal probability effects are 
allowed to change their sign (effect) once (Boes and Winkelman, 2006). Borrowing from 
Long and Freese (2005), the ordered response model is equivalent to j – 1 binary 
regressions, assuming that the slope coefficient for each regressor is constant across 
regressions (i.e. parallel lines assumption). 
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iitiitit
iitiitit
iitiitit
xxJy
xxy
xxy







               (4) 
 
This assumption can be formally tested through Log-likelihood ratio (LR) tests 
(Long and Freese, 2005) and its rejection indicates the need to permit the cut-off points to 
be linear functions of the regressors of interest (Maddala, 1983; Terza, 1985; Boes and 
Winkelman, 2006), in our case income, and thus allowing the model to follow and 
represent human behaviour more efficiently.  
 
itjjij zk                        (5) 
 
where itz is a vector including the income variables. From equations (4) and (5), 
conditioning on the time invariant individual component, i , the conditional probabilities 
become
6
: 
 
Jjforxz
xzxjy
ijititjj
ijititjjijitit
,...,1)(
)(),|Pr(
1 

 

     (6) 
 
where jj   , which cannot be separately identified, while the properties of 
equation (3) still hold. itx and itz are assumed to be exogenous conditional on ij .  
Treating ij as fixed parameters to be estimated, with a large number of individuals 
and fixed number of time periods, introduces incidental parameters problem (Lancaster 
2000; Wooldridge, 2002, 2005; Greene, 2004), biasing the estimated coefficients. 
Therefore, we use a random effects specification and following Mundlak (1978) and 
Chamberlain (1982) we relax the assumption of no correlation among ij and the 
                                               
6 The generalized random effects ordered probit model was estimated in Stata SE 9.2 using the user-written 
routine –regoprob- by Stephan Boes (http://econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/s456604.htm).  
 10 
covariates. In doing so we parameterise ij  by conditioning the distribution of the 
unobserved effect on the exogenous independent variables. 
 
iiijij vzx  )(                       (7) 
 
where ix and iz  are the averages of the exogenous regressors over the sample period, 
while iv  is the individual specific error, where ),0(~|
2
vii Nxv   and independent of the 
idiosyncratic error it . The coefficients of time-invariant variables cannot be disentangled 
from ij  in equation 6 and their inclusion is not meaningful (Wooldridge, 2002). Hence, 
we follow a split sample analysis to distinguish the behaviours of the two genders. 
Initially, we estimate a model where only absolute income is included and then a model 
where absolute and relative incomes are included together.  
For the interpretation of our estimation results we use marginal effects. Since, all 
the variables of interest (absolute and relative income) are binary indicators it would be 
more appropriate to talk about discrete changes, which are the changes in the predicted 
probability for a change in income class (or financial situation) holding all the other 
variables constant and other income classes (or financial situations) at zero. For the 
generalized random effects ordered probit the discrete change
7
 can be written formally as: 
 
     0,,|Pr1,,|Pr,|Pr  kijititkijititkititit zxjyzxjyzxjy          (8)  
 
4. Data 
 
For this study we use the British household Panel Survey (BHPS), for the years 
1996 to 2003. The BHPS is an annual longitudinal survey carried out by the ESRC UK 
                                               
7 For the computation of discrete changes, population average parameters 
2/12 )1(*  va   were 
used (Wooldridge, 2005). They allow for comparisons between estimations from pooled and panel 
specifications, which otherwise have different error variances, resulting in different scaling of the 
coefficients. 
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Longitudinal Studies Centre with the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the 
University of Essex, which targets individuals of the age of 16 and over. As is often the 
case, the SWB measure is derived by the question, “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you 
with your life overall”, with 7 possible outcomes ranging from “not satisfied at all” to 
“completely satisfied”. Due to low incidence rates the first two outcomes were aggregate 
and the distribution of the variable for males and females is presented in Fig. 1. It is 
evident that the distribution is skewed to the right, meaning that most of the people in our 
sample (around 60%-65%) have a level of SWB close to the highest level. Table 1 shows 
average SWB by income which ranges from 4.01 to 4.49 for female and from 4.12 to 
4.41 for male. SWB scores increase as income increases for both genders.  
As indicators of absolute income we use categorical equivalised annual household 
income with five levels representing the quintiles of its distribution (see e.g., Alesina et 
al., 2004; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Vendrik and Woltjer, 2007). Because the first 
and the fifth income quintiles aggregate very heterogeneous groups (from £0 to £10,360 
per year for the first and from £30,000 to £248,000 per year for the last)
8
, we further 
divided them into two subgroups each accounting 10% of the income distribution, giving 
us a total of seven income status segments. For the equivalisation we employ the 
McClements (1977) equivalisation scale, which was provided in the raw data. It is clear, 
that happiness for an individual is very much dependent on their income after taking into 
consideration the size and composition of their household and hence, two individuals 
stating the same household income do not belong in the same income category if one of 
them is single, thus having his total income at his disposal, and the other one is married 
with children, thus in need to share his income across the members of the family. Table 2 
shows some descriptive statistics of income dummies by gender and how they relate to 
the original continuous equivalised income variable. As already described income was 
collapsed into 7 categories (without distinguishing among male and female). The 
minimum and maximum levels of income are displayed for each income group in order to 
show the relative dispersion. The first income group includes people with income varying 
between £0 and £7,505, the second income group includes equivalised income ranging 
                                               
8
 47 observations with annual income greater then 250,000£ were dropped as outliers. 
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among £7,506 to £10,366 and so on. It follows, that median income is included in the 4
th
 
income class by design. The average income is slightly higher than the median income 
for both genders and the income differences among genders are tiny in each income 
group, while males have a slightly higher average income in every income class but the 
5
th
. The average income for males is £23,987 while for females is £22,892. 
Perceived financial situation is used as a proxy of relative individual income under 
the assumption that when people characterise their financial situation they take into 
account their feelings about their situation which might be influenced by their past 
situations, by the situation of their peers and by various environmental factors. Perceived 
financial situation is, thus, extracted by the question, “How well would you say you 
yourself are managing financially these days? Would you say you are…” with 5 potential 
different outcomes: “Finding it very difficult”, “Finding it quite difficult“, “Just about 
getting by”, “Doing alright” and “Living comfortably”. Table 3 presents the distribution 
of the perceived financial situation variable (i.e. relative income). We can see that almost 
the same percentage of female and male (38% and 37%, respectively) reports themselves 
as “doing alright” (the 4th category), followed by 31%-32% of people that declare of 
being at the highest category. The correlation matrices for female and male in table 4 
show that absolute income and perceived relative income are just slightly correlated. In 
particular, those who belong to the first three income groups are more likely to report 
“just about getting by” and “finding it very difficult”, but the relationship is weak and 
decreasing as we move along the financial situation and income classes. Belonging to the 
highest income classes is negatively correlated with low perceived financial status.  
As confounding factors a set of individual socio-demographic characteristics, 
common in the previous literature (Helliwell, 2002; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 
2004), are included in each model specification. In particular we add age, household size, 
number of kids, education and marital status, as well as, controlling for endogeneity, the 
lagged values of self-assessed health and unemployment. Moreover, in order to account 
for spatial and temporal heterogeneity a set of binary indicators capturing the region fixed 
effects and a set of time-dummies were also included in the model estimations. 
 
5. Estimation results  
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As discussed in section 3, LR-tests were run to check for the appropriateness of the 
parallel lines assumption. The equality of the coefficients across outcome categories can 
be rejected at 1% significance level in every case
9
. Thus, estimations for the traditional 
random effects ordered probit are not discussed any further
10
. Moreover, as the 
coefficients from ordered response models provide indication only for the direction of an 
effect but not for its magnitude, we concentrate on the marginal effects for the 
generalised models, where the parameters are interpreted as discrete changes computed as 
in equation (10), keeping the median category as the reference group.  
Table 5 presents the results of the models that include absolute income as covariates 
but not relative income. We see the three lowest income categories having a higher 
probability of reporting low SWB (levels 1 to 3), although with particularly low statistical 
significance. Similarly, insignificant parameters are observed for the rich in the first three 
SWB categories, with the exception of the negative significant ai6 and ai7 for SWB level 
3
11
.  
Moving to SWB levels 4 and 5, which are the relatively most common in the 
sample, we observe a change of behaviour, with individuals of low income reporting 
being less likely to belong in them (2-5 percentage points, p.p.
12
, decrease relative to the 
base) and for the richest a corresponding increase in probability of 5-6 p.p. Especially for 
SWB level 4, statistical significance lies with the low income groups, while for SWB 
level 5 the effect is more robust across the whole distribution, with magnitudes ranging 
from -5.3. to 6.4 p.p. for females and from -8.3 to 6.2 p.p. for males, revealing a broad 
heterogeneity across income groups. Most importantly, the wealthiest males behave in a 
                                               
9 The null hypothesis of equal slope for all income dummies across SWB categories was rejected for 
female, LR252 = 1519, and male, LR252 = 1250, in models with absolute income, excluding relative income. 
Similarly for models with absolute and relative income groups included, the rejection of the null was 
reported with LR83 = 1614 and LR83 = 1613 for females and males, respectively.  
10 Estimation results for the ordered probit models are available from the authors upon request. 
11 For notational simplicity in the text and tables we use ai1, ai2, ai3, etc., to define the absolute income 
groups considered, while fs1, fs2, etc., to define the relative income (financial situation) groups.  
12
 Due to the frequent use of the term “percentage points”, we abbreviate it to “p.p.”. 
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similar manner to the poor, with a negative probability of 3.1 and 7 p.p. of belonging to 
SWB levels 4 and 5, respectively.  
On the other hand, the discrete changes for the final column, J = 6, show 
consistently and for both genders, low income individuals to be more likely to report the 
happiest category, with the second poorest (ai2) having the highest chance of all, with 4.7 
p.p. and 6.1 p.p. relative to the base (median) income group, for females and males, 
respectively. Belonging in high income classes, negatively affects the probability of 
reporting the highest level of SWB, with the probability decreasing of about 2 p.p. (or 3) 
for female (or male) in the 5
th
 income class and by about 3 p.p. for the 6
th
 and 7
th
 for 
female, while slightly larger figures are reported for male (7 p.p. for the 6
th
 and 5 p.p. for 
the 7
th
). 
Moving on to Table 6, we present the marginal effects of the models including both 
absolute and relative income. For J = 1 to 4, there is a general lack of significance with 
the exception of the richest individuals, who are less likely to belong to SWB level 3, 
something that holds for both genders. Looking at SWB level 6, low income individuals 
have an increased probability of about 2-4 p.p. relative to the base in reporting J=6, with 
the second poorest (ai2) having the highest probability (5.7 and 4.5 p.p. for females and 
males respectively) of all. On the contrary, high income individuals, face a decreased 
probability by a similar amount.  
Turning to the relative income (subjective financial situation) variables, poor 
individuals of both genders are more likely to report the first three SWB levels, with 
those being not satisfied with their own financial situation facing an increased probability 
of reporting “completely dissatisfied” with life by a significant 7 p.p. Poverty, both 
defined as absolute and relative, is strongly associated with low levels of SWB. 
Furthermore, the probability associated with reporting the relatively most common SWB 
levels, J = 4 and J = 5, decreases considerably for the poor although, it is significant only 
for the latter. SWB level 5 is more probably to be observed for wealthy individuals (5.5 
and 8.6 p.p. for females and 5.6 and 6.4 p.p. for males, according to income group), while 
there is a striking symmetry of the coefficients for females.  
It is important to note the conditional interpretation of our results. The discrete 
probability effects for absolute income give the changes in the probability for a particular 
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SWB level conditional on the fact that relative income remains unchanged. For females 
in J=5, a change from ai4 to ai6 increase the probability of J=5 by 5.2 p.p. when 
financial situation remains the same. However, a simultaneous change from fs1 to fs2 
creates an additional increase in the probability of J=5 by about 2.6 p.p. (-0.0555-(-
0.0816) = 0.0261).  
At last, higher categories of financial situation have a negative (although not 
significant) effect on the probability of being happier. Reporting a satisfying financial 
situation is related to negative chances of having low SWB and positive chances of 
scoring high SWB. In other words, the richest, in terms of relative income, report 
themselves to be the happiest. The latter result, however, is statistically significant only 
for the people belonging to the highest relative category, “living comfortably”, and not 
for those who are “doing alright”. Although this result is opposite to what we found in 
relation to absolute income, it agrees with the finding in Table 5 that the richest males are 
most likely to be among the happiest individuals.  
 
6. Discussion 
 
As is clear from our results, different dimensions of the income-happiness 
relationship can be detected by looking at SWB and income distributions, i.e., along the 
horizontal and vertical axes of Table 5 and 6, respectively, while no differences are 
revealed from gender comparisons.  
Looking at Tables 5 and 6, distinctive patterns emerge between poor and rich 
(relative to the median income class), whose effects have always opposite directions. 
These patterns have been stylised for ease of exposition in Fig. 2, which is divided in two 
parts, with the upper part illustrating the effects of absolute income on SWB, while the 
lower part illustrates the effects of relative income. The vertical lines represent SWB 
thresholds while the horizontal lines represent low and high income group. The minus 
and plus signs identify the likelihood of reporting the SWB levels reported in each 
column (with respect to the median class).  
Summarising the identified behaviour for absolute income we have collapsed the 
SWB levels in three labels ‘dissatisfied’ (J = 1, 2 and 3), ‘satisfied’ (J = 4 and 5) 
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‘completely satisfied’ (J = 6). This finding is not affected by the inclusion or exclusion of 
relative income. Low income people are more likely to not be satisfied with their lives; 
while higher income people are less likely to report low happiness levels. For the sake of 
simplicity, we could stylise this finding by saying that “income buys off 
unhappiness”13,14. Looking at the fact that wealthier individuals are more likely to report 
more satisfaction with their life than those with lower income situations we could argue 
that income not only buys off un-happiness, but also it buys a big portion of happiness. 
As Fig. 1 shows, more than half of our sample is concentrated here, reporting SWB levels 
of either 4 or 5. Up to now, our findings confirm the bulk of the literature on the positive 
relationship between income and happiness (see section 2). However, does income buy 
all the happiness? The third column of the upper part of Fig. 2 shows the likelihood of 
reporting the highest level of SWB. Paradoxically, belonging to high income group 
decreases the probability of reporting the highest level of SWB, indicating that income 
buys happiness, but up to a point. In support of this argument comes another unexpected 
finding; the fact that lower income individuals are more likely to report “completely 
satisfied” with their life.  
Explanations for these paradoxes can be found in the literature on the presence of 
hedonic adaptations, aspirations and comparison effects dating back to Veblen (1899), 
Duesenberry (1949), Easterlin (1975) and, more recently, Frank (1997) and Easterlin 
(2001) and relating to the ideas of interdependence of preferences and the consequent 
positional externalities. Inclusion of perceived financial situation (relative income) 
capturing the aforementioned effects confirms the idea that relative income matters. The 
importance of relative income is also apparent in our data. Previous studies (Van de Stadt 
et al., 1985; Clark and Oswald, 1996; McBride, 2001; Stutzer, 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 
2005; Vendrik and Woltjer, 2007) have also consistently found income relative to 
individual’s own past (adaptation effects), future (aspiration or expectation effects) and 
peers (comparison effects) to be as important as absolute income in determining 
                                               
13 “Do you know what I do about unhappiness? I buy it off”, Psycho, Alfred Hitchcock, 1960 (screenplay 
by Joseph Stefano): This concept permeates popular culture giving birth to many ways of expressing the 
same meaning. 
14
 Here for simplicity of exposition, “unhappiness” is defined as the first three levels of SWB.  
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subjective well-being, with the relative income effects even cancelling out the effects on 
SWB brought about by absolute income growth.  
As discussed in sections 2 and 4, we include perceived financial situation as a proxy 
for relative income in our models. The lower part of Fig. 2 shows that the effects of 
relative income, controlling for absolute income, appears to have a linear effect on 
happiness. Low relative income individuals are more probable to report low levels of 
SWB, while wealthier individuals are more likely to report high level of SWB. Contrary 
to absolute income, relative income brings the highest level of happiness (J=6), whereas 
for all other income groups, relative income is not the mean to achieve happiness. This 
finding could be a corollary of the fact that how rich is someone is more accurately 
measured by his relative income and that truly rich are those appearing in high relative 
income groups. We should mention that this implies that people with low absolute 
income can report the highest relative income and this is exactly due to the surroundings 
that affect ones perception of wealth.  
Furthermore, looking at relative income, there is weak evidence for heterogeneous 
SWB threshold points between different relative income groups, revealing different 
notions of satisfaction between rich and poor. This is shown by the discontinuous vertical 
line in the lower part of Fig. 2. It is possible, that heterogeneity in how happiness is 
defined among individuals is a reason for observing the last relative income group, fs5, to 
report highly significant and negative discrete effects, the same as fs1. Finally, 
considering the magnitude of the discrete changes on the various probabilities we find 
that in the majority of cases relative income appears to be at least as influential as 
absolute income, further supporting the argument for the importance of relative income 
when one evaluates their well-being. 
Another explanation of these paradoxes, commonly put forward, refers to the 
literature about social capital, relational goods, and hedonic psychology (Kahnemann et 
al., 1999; Helliwell, 2006). High-income individuals are more likely to have jobs of high 
responsibility and to allocate their time to activities that are on average associated with 
more stress and tension, e.g. commuting, (Frey and Stutzer, 2002), or less likely to spend 
their time in socialising, which is among the most rewarding activities in terms of 
happiness (Kahnemann et al., 2004; Kahnemann et al., 2006). Conversely, low income 
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groups might not have any difficulty in accessing these goods, explaining why a portion 
of the low income group is likely to report the highest level of SWB.  
However, such interpretations make strong assumptions about the causality of the 
observed effects. Our adoption of the Mundlak (1978) approach allows us to avoid 
estimation of biased parameters in the presence of time-invariant unobserved factors that 
are causally related to SWB and non-causally linked to income generation. However, the 
existence of unobserved time-varying factors that lead to loss of SWB and also generate 
higher income (e.g. stressful jobs lead to lower SWB but generate high income) leads to 
biased estimates of the effect of income per se on SWB. In other cases (e.g. where higher 
income people indulge in more health-harming activities) these unobserved factors 
should be viewed as part of the causal link between higher income and lower SWB. 
Therefore, statements about the presence of a direct causal relationship between income 
and SWB should be treated with caution because unobserved (time-varying) factors may 
present potential simultaneity problems (Adams et al., 2003).  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between income and happiness using a 
generalised ordered probit model with a specification capable of distinguishing income 
effects on SWB across different income groups and different SWB levels. The variety of 
distinctive patterns derived is a direct result of our estimation strategy and specifically, 
due to the transformation of income variable into income dummies and the use of a 
generalized model.  
The poor are more likely to be unhappy while the rich are more likely to be fairly 
happy. Absolute income buys-off unhappiness, but it does not seem to buy all levels of 
happiness. This can be explained by looking at relative income effects, through the 
inclusion of individuals’ subjective financial situation which captures ones relative 
income position and clearly confirms the findings of the past literature. Our findings can 
provide a framework for the rationalisation of the Easterlin paradox found within the UK 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). The paradox states that, in the long run, happiness 
does not follow increases in income, while when looking at a cross section of the 
 19 
population, the wealthier are happier. Turning at our results, we verify absolute income 
explaining the first part of the paradox, while relative income the latter and highlighting 
the importance of relative status as a determinant of well-being.  
Another explanation of these findings, relates to the concept of time-shift effects, 
where high income individuals tend to engage in less satisfactory activities. Even though 
our model allows for correlation among individual (time-invariant) effects and income; 
the proposed explanation would run into simultaneity problems if factors that affect the 
loss of SWB contemporaneously affect income. Further research would be necessary 
focussing on these issues and including variables and instruments to control for the 
currently unobserved factors (e.g. social networks, job types, stress level, etc.). 
Furthermore, our estimator could be improved by treating individual heterogeneity 
as fixed effects and specifying a generalised conditional fixed effects ordered logit; 
however, such models require stronger statistical assumptions and require even further 
assumptions to provide estimates for partial effects and average partial effects 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 492), which as we see are imperative for inference. Finally, in our 
study we relax as many restricting assumptions as possible and it would be necessary for 
this type of analysis to be replicated in order to test the robustness of the findings and 
whether they are country specific or widely generalisable.  
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Fig. 1. Distribution of SWB across response categories by gender 
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Fig. 2. A stylised graph of absolute and relative income effects for the low and high income group 
(relatively to the median class) 
 
 Dissatisfied Satisfied Completely satisfied 
Absolutely 
Poor 
+ - + 
Absolutely 
Rich 
- + - 
 
 Dissatisfied Satisfied and completely satisfied 
Relatively 
Poor 
+  - 
Relatively 
Rich 
-  + 
 
Note: a positive sign means that the income group in the row is more likely to belong to the column 
category (than the median income group). 
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Table 1 
Average SWB by gender and income groups 
Absolute income 
groups 
Mean SWB N % 
   
    
 Females 
ai1 4 2297 8.5% 
ai2 4.2 2463 9.1% 
ai3 4.2 4951 18.4% 
ai4 4.3 5395 20.0% 
ai5 4.4 5832 21.6% 
ai6 4.4 2896 10.7% 
ai7 4.5 3112 11.5% 
    
Total 4.3 26946 100% 
    
 Males 
ai1 4 1530 6.5% 
ai2 4 1880 7.9% 
ai3 4 4231 17.8% 
ai4 4 4863 20.5% 
ai5 4 5405 22.8% 
ai6 4 2833 11.9% 
ai7 4 2970 12.5% 
    
Total 4 23712 100% 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics on equivalised income by gender and income classes 
Absolute income 
groups 
Mean Min Max N % 
      
 Females 
ai1 4917 0 7504 2297 9% 
ai2 9006 7506 10364 2463 9% 
ai3 12863 10366 15371 4951 18% 
ai4 18232 15372 21203 5395 20% 
ai5 25336 21204 30320 5832 22% 
ai6 34280 30326 39262 2896 11% 
ai7 56011 39268 241070 3112 12% 
      
Total 22893 0 241070 26946 100% 
      
 Males 
ai1 4923 0 7504 1530 6% 
ai2 9031 7506 10364 1880 8% 
ai3 12922 10366 15370 4231 18% 
ai4 18237 15372 21203 4863 21% 
ai5 25358 21204 30320 5405 23% 
ai6 34336 30331 39262 2833 12% 
ai7 56142 39281 241070 2970 13% 
      
Total 23994 0 241070 23712  
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Table 3 
Distribution of “perceived financial situation” 
 Variable  
labels 
N % 
    
 Females 
finding it very difficult  fs1 547 2% 
finding it quite difficult fs2 1329 5% 
just about getting by fs3 6276 23% 
doing alright fs4 10309 38% 
living comfortably fs5 8485 31% 
Total  26946  
    
 Males 
finding it very difficult fs1 411 2% 
finding it quite difficult fs2 1023 4% 
just about getting by fs3 5711 24% 
doing alright fs4 8890 37% 
living comfortably fs5 7677 32% 
Total  23712  
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Table 4 
Correlation between income classes and perceived financial situation 
 Absolute income groups  Relative income groups 
 ai1 ai2 ai3 ai4 ai5 ai6 ai7  fs1 fs2 fs3 s4 fs5 
 Females 
Absolute 
income groups 
             
ai1 1             
ai2 -0.0968 1.0000            
ai3 -0.1448 -0.1505 1.0000           
ai4 -0.1527 -0.1587 -0.2374 1.0000          
ai5 -0.1604 -0.1667 -0.2493 -0.2630 1.0000         
ai6 -0.1059 -0.1101 -0.1646 -0.1736 -0.1824 1.0000        
ai7 -0.1103 -0.1146 -0.1714 -0.1808 -0.1899 -0.1254 1.0000       
Relative 
income groups  
             
fs1 0.0927 0.0557 0.0166 -0.0161 -0.0431 -0.0347 -0.0421  1.0000     
fs2 0.0943 0.0669 0.0318 -0.0249 -0.0448 -0.0348 -0.0587  -0.0328 1.0000    
fs3 0.0994 0.1083 0.0773 0.0150 -0.0730 -0.0767 -0.1285  -0.0793 -0.1255 1.0000   
fs4 -0.0541 -0.0462 -0.0128 0.0445 0.0497 0.0151 -0.0298  -0.1133 -0.1793 -0.4338 1.0000  
fs5 -0.1060 -0.0983 -0.0768 -0.0437 0.0484 0.0808 0.1883  -0.0976 -0.1544 -0.3736 -0.5337 1 
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Table 4 
continued 
 Absolute income groups  Relative income groups 
 ai1 ai2 ai3 ai4 ai5 ai6 ai7  fs1 fs2 fs3 s4 fs5 
 Males 
Absolute 
income groups 
       
 
     
ai1 1             
ai2 -0.0771 1.0000            
ai3 -0.1224 -0.1368 1.0000           
ai4 -0.1334 -0.1491 -0.2367 1.0000          
ai5 -0.1427 -0.1594 -0.2532 -0.2760 1.0000         
ai6 -0.0967 -0.1081 -0.1717 -0.1871 -0.2002 1.0000        
ai7 -0.0994 -0.1110 -0.1763 -0.1922 -0.2056 -0.1394 1.0000       
Relative income 
groups 
       
 
     
fs1 0.0861 0.0507 0.0276 -0.0074 -0.0437 -0.0360 -0.0376  1.0000     
fs2 0.0642 0.0506 0.0295 -0.0061 -0.0224 -0.0360 -0.0521  -0.0282 1.0000    
fs3 0.0793 0.1037 0.0950 0.0224 -0.0665 -0.0786 -0.1196  -0.0748 -0.1196 1.0000   
fs4 -0.0371 -0.0428 -0.0171 0.0356 0.0462 0.0204 -0.0396  -0.1029 -0.1644 -0.4362 1.0000  
fs5 -0.0860 -0.0866 -0.0896 -0.0526 0.0348 0.0764 0.1834  -0.0919 -0.1469 -0.3897 -0.5359 1 
Note: Variable labels fs1, fs2, etc., are the first, the second, etc., of the relative income groups (see Table 3) 
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Table 5  
Discrete changes on probabilities for the generalised model without relative income (reference group: ai4) 
Income 
groups J = 1 J = 2 J = 3 J = 4 J = 5 J = 6 
       
 Females 
ai1 0.0170** 0.0145* 0.0191* -0.0269** -0.0537*** 0.0299** 
 (0.0081) (0.0087) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
ai2 0.0190** 0.00281 0.0173 -0.0398*** -0.0464*** 0.0471*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0085) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
ai3 0.0115* 0.00611 -0.000632 0.000646 -0.0420*** 0.0243** 
 (0.0064) (0.0069) (0.0089) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0096) 
ai5 -0.00710 -0.00392 -0.0149* 0.0130 0.0332*** -0.0203** 
 (0.0060) (0.0066) (0.0085) (0.010) (0.011) (0.0089) 
ai6 -0.00398 -0.00956 -0.0218** 0.0139 0.0542*** -0.0328*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0080) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) 
ai7 -0.0166** -0.00566 -0.0335*** 0.0243* 0.0640*** -0.0326*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0085) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
       
 Males 
ai1 0.0194* 0.0163 -0.0108 -0.0224 -0.0562*** 0.0536*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
ai2 0.0170* 0.0158 0.0229* -0.0334** -0.0832*** 0.0610*** 
 (0.0096) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
ai3 0.00922 0.0133* 0.00695 -0.0251** -0.0278** 0.0234** 
 (0.0069) (0.0076) (0.0096) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) 
ai5 -0.0106* 0.0000791 0.0000627 0.0135 0.0256** -0.0286*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0072) (0.0091) (0.011) (0.012) (0.0092) 
ai6 -0.00991 -0.00936 -0.0219** 0.0210 0.0618*** -0.0416*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0084) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) 
ai7 -0.0130 -0.0080 -0.0341*** 0.0306*** 0.0737*** -0.0491*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0094) (0.0127) (0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0142) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 
Discrete changes on probabilities for the generalised models with absolute and relative income (reference 
groups ai4 and fs3) 
Income 
groups J = 1 J = 2 J = 3 J = 4 J = 5 J = 6 
       
 Females 
ai1 0.0113 0.0111 -0.0119 -0.0165 -0.0424** 0.0485*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0099) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) 
ai2 0.0106 0.0124 0.0213* -0.0308** -0.0711*** 0.0576*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0095) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) 
ai3 0.00596 0.0112 0.00644 -0.0251** -0.0217* 0.0232** 
 (0.0062) (0.0071) (0.0094) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) 
ai5 -0.00968* 0.00153 0.00173 0.0132 0.0205* -0.0272*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0068) (0.0090) (0.011) (0.012) (0.0090) 
ai6 -0.00747 -0.00664 -0.0197* 0.0214 0.0520*** -0.0396*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0080) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) 
ai7 -0.0115 -0.00492 -0.0313*** 0.0333** 0.0612*** -0.0468*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0083) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) 
fs1 0.0845*** 0.0484*** 0.00379 -0.0690** -0.0816*** 0.0139 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.023) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) 
fs2 0.0293*** 0.0224** 0.0213 -0.0134 -0.0555*** -0.00417 
 (0.0097) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) 
fs4 -0.0158*** -0.0227*** -0.0300*** 0.00910 0.0558*** 0.00353 
 (0.0049) (0.0058) (0.0075) (0.0096) (0.010) (0.0081) 
fs5 -0.0142** -0.0309*** -0.0449*** -0.0248** 0.0866*** 0.0282*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0065) (0.0084) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0091) 
       
 Males 
ai1 0.0103 0.0102 0.0197* -0.0214 -0.0437*** 0.0248* 
 (0.0074) (0.0083) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
ai2 0.0137* -0.00193 0.0156 -0.0371*** -0.0355** 0.0452*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0080) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
ai3 0.00939 0.00457 -0.000827 0.00194 -0.0384*** 0.0233** 
 (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0089) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0095) 
ai5 -0.00592 -0.00295 -0.0137 0.0134 0.0306*** -0.0214** 
 (0.0055) (0.0064) (0.0085) (0.010) (0.011) (0.0087) 
ai6 -0.00266 -0.00853 -0.0199* 0.0155 0.0495*** -0.0339*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0076) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) 
ai7 -0.0159** -0.00197 -0.0291*** 0.0272** 0.0552*** -0.0355*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0083) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) 
fs1 0.0764*** 0.0377** 0.00906 -0.0254 -0.0817*** -0.0161 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
fs2 0.0322*** 0.0205** 0.0188 -0.0131 -0.0454*** -0.0129 
 (0.0087) (0.0098) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) 
fs4 -0.0168*** -0.0232*** -0.0256*** 0.00248 0.0568*** 0.00636 
 (0.0046) (0.0054) (0.0072) (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0078) 
fs5 -0.0141** -0.0312*** -0.0461*** -0.0235** 0.0641*** 0.0508*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0061) (0.0080) (0.0095) (0.0099) (0.0090) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1  
Coefficients estimate after the random effects generalized ordered probit  for females 
 Subjective well-being levels 
Income groups J = 1 J = 2 J = 3 J = 4 J = 5 
ai1 -0.231*** -0.252*** -0.262*** -0.105** 0.181*** 
 (0.076) (0.058) (0.048) (0.046) (0.056) 
ai2 -0.252*** -0.176*** -0.203*** 0.00301 0.278*** 
 (0.075) (0.058) (0.047) (0.045) (0.052) 
ai3 -0.161** -0.146*** -0.0903** -0.0783** 0.149*** 
 (0.063) (0.047) (0.037) (0.034) (0.041) 
ai5 0.112* 0.0987** 0.144*** 0.0572* -0.133*** 
 (0.067) (0.048) (0.037) (0.033) (0.041) 
ai6 0.0615 0.122** 0.198*** 0.0953** -0.218*** 
 (0.082) (0.061) (0.047) (0.042) (0.053) 
ai7 0.282*** 0.206*** 0.320*** 0.140*** -0.217*** 
 (0.096) (0.066) (0.052) (0.046) (0.055) 
Lag-SAH 0.0546** 0.0546** 0.0546** 0.0546** 0.0546** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Age -0.0149*** -0.0149*** -0.0149*** -0.0149*** -0.0149*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) 
educ2 0.0287 0.0287 0.0287 0.0287 0.0287 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
educ3 -0.153 -0.153 -0.153 -0.153 -0.153 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
educ4 -0.377** -0.377** -0.377** -0.377** -0.377** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
married 0.151** 0.151** 0.151** 0.151** 0.151** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
divsep -0.208** -0.208** -0.208** -0.208** -0.208** 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) 
widowed -0.286* -0.286* -0.286* -0.286* -0.286* 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Lag-
unemployed 
-0.0106 -0.0106 -0.0106 -0.0106 -0.0106 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
# of kids 0.0498** 0.0498** 0.0498** 0.0498** 0.0498** 
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 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
household size -0.0645*** -0.0645*** -0.0645*** -0.0645*** -0.0645*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Constant 0.978*** 0.262* -0.677*** -1.817*** -3.274*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Obs 26966 26966 26966 26966 26966 
Log- L -37160     
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: coefficients on time dummies and regional dummies not reported 
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Table A2 
Coefficients estimate after the random effects generalized ordered probit for males 
 Subjective well-being levels 
Income groups J = 1 J = 2 J = 3 J = 4 J = 5 
ai1 -0.281*** -0.306*** -0.143** -0.0119 0.352*** 
 (0.093) (0.071) (0.059) (0.055) (0.066) 
ai2 -0.246*** -0.280*** -0.310*** -0.104** 0.392*** 
 (0.090) (0.067) (0.055) (0.052) (0.062) 
ai3 -0.141** -0.199*** -0.168*** -0.0205 0.161*** 
 (0.072) (0.052) (0.041) (0.037) (0.047) 
ai5 0.188** 0.103* 0.0625 -0.0142 -0.215*** 
 (0.077) (0.053) (0.040) (0.035) (0.047) 
ai6 0.174* 0.193*** 0.255*** 0.0941** -0.322*** 
 (0.096) (0.068) (0.052) (0.045) (0.061) 
ai7 0.234** 0.213*** 0.348*** 0.115** -0.387*** 
 (0.10) (0.072) (0.057) (0.050) (0.065) 
Lag-SAH 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Age -0.0186*** -0.0186*** -0.0186*** -0.0186*** -0.0186*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) 
educ2 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.115 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
educ3 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.145 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
educ4 -0.161 -0.161 -0.161 -0.161 -0.161 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
married 0.0292 0.0292 0.0292 0.0292 0.0292 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
divsep -0.571*** -0.571*** -0.571*** -0.571*** -0.571*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
widowed 0.0499 0.0499 0.0499 0.0499 0.0499 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Lag-
unemployed 0.0739** 0.0739** 0.0739** 0.0739** 0.0739** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
# of kids 0.0371 0.0371 0.0371 0.0371 0.0371 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
 35 
household size -0.0430** -0.0430** -0.0430** -0.0430** -0.0430** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant 0.869*** 0.135 -0.802*** -2.115*** -3.783*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Obs 23732 23732 23732 23732 23732 
Log-L -31155     
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: coefficients on time dummies and regional dummies not reported 
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Table A3 
Coefficients estimate after the random effects generalized ordered probit  female, absolute and 
relative income dummies 
 Subjective well-being levels 
Income groups J = 1 J = 2 J = 3 J = 4 J = 5 
ai1 -0.154** -0.172*** -0.206*** -0.0809* 0.149*** 
 (0.078) (0.060) (0.049) (0.047) (0.056) 
ai2 -0.198*** -0.100* -0.141*** 0.0416 0.263*** 
 (0.076) (0.059) (0.048) (0.045) (0.053) 
ai3 -0.141** -0.119** -0.0688* -0.0645* 0.140*** 
 (0.064) (0.048) (0.038) (0.035) (0.041) 
ai5 0.0996 0.0813* 0.123*** 0.0393 -0.138*** 
 (0.068) (0.048) (0.037) (0.033) (0.041) 
ai6 0.0435 0.103* 0.171*** 0.0667 -0.224*** 
 (0.083) (0.061) (0.048) (0.043) (0.053) 
ai7 0.293*** 0.169** 0.262*** 0.0842* -0.235*** 
 (0.099) (0.067) (0.053) (0.047) (0.056) 
fs1 -0.776*** -0.715*** -0.564*** -0.436*** -0.110 
 (0.089) (0.079) (0.079) (0.093) (0.13) 
fs2 -0.385*** -0.362*** -0.335*** -0.256*** -0.0882 
 (0.068) (0.055) (0.050) (0.055) (0.076) 
fs4 0.270*** 0.344*** 0.342*** 0.271*** 0.0418 
 (0.053) (0.038) (0.030) (0.029) (0.037) 
fs5 0.221*** 0.396*** 0.490*** 0.493*** 0.312*** 
 (0.065) (0.047) (0.037) (0.034) (0.041) 
Lag-SAH 0.0539** 0.0539** 0.0539** 0.0539** 0.0539** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Age -0.0484*** -0.0484*** -0.0484*** -0.0484*** -0.0484*** 
 (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) 
educ2 0.0160 0.0160 0.0160 0.0160 0.0160 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
educ3 -0.139 -0.139 -0.139 -0.139 -0.139 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
educ4 -0.261 -0.261 -0.261 -0.261 -0.261 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
married 0.132** 0.132** 0.132** 0.132** 0.132** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
divsep -0.134 -0.134 -0.134 -0.134 -0.134 
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 (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) 
widowed -0.229 -0.229 -0.229 -0.229 -0.229 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Lag-
unemployed 0.00738 0.00738 0.00738 0.00738 0.00738 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
# of kids 0.0593*** 0.0593*** 0.0593*** 0.0593*** 0.0593*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
household size -0.0655*** -0.0655*** -0.0655*** -0.0655*** -0.0655*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Constant 1.215*** 0.419*** -0.560*** -1.691*** -3.007*** 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Obs 26946 26946 26946 26946 26946 
Log-L -36434     
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: coefficients on time dummies and regional dummies not reported 
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Table A4 
Coefficients estimate after the random effects generalized ordered probit male, absolute and 
relative income dummies 
 Subjective well-being levels 
Income groups J = 1 J = 2 J = 3 J = 4 J = 5 
ai1 -0.183* -0.205*** -0.0602 0.0271 0.315*** 
 (0.097) (0.073) (0.060) (0.056) (0.067) 
ai2 -0.171* -0.208*** -0.245*** -0.0603 0.367*** 
 (0.092) (0.068) (0.056) (0.052) (0.062) 
ai3 -0.100 -0.160*** -0.134*** 0.00668 0.157*** 
 (0.073) (0.053) (0.041) (0.038) (0.047) 
ai5 0.186** 0.0825 0.0376 -0.0302 -0.203*** 
 (0.078) (0.054) (0.040) (0.035) (0.046) 
ai6 0.141 0.146** 0.205*** 0.0555 -0.304*** 
 (0.097) (0.069) (0.052) (0.045) (0.060) 
ai7 0.225** 0.171** 0.296*** 0.0647 -0.365*** 
 (0.10) (0.074) (0.058) (0.050) (0.066) 
fs1 -0.916*** -0.873*** -0.663*** -0.313*** 0.102 
 (0.10) (0.090) (0.091) (0.11) (0.15) 
fs2 -0.393*** -0.385*** -0.366*** -0.275*** -0.0317 
 (0.082) (0.064) (0.057) (0.063) (0.088) 
fs4 0.285*** 0.361*** 0.387*** 0.267*** 0.0265 
 (0.062) (0.042) (0.033) (0.031) (0.042) 
fs5 0.253*** 0.434*** 0.523*** 0.516*** 0.201*** 
 (0.075) (0.053) (0.041) (0.037) (0.046) 
Lag-SAH 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Age -0.0480*** -0.0480*** -0.0480*** -0.0480*** -0.0480*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0087) 
educ2 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
educ3 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
educ4 -0.177 -0.177 -0.177 -0.177 -0.177 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
married 0.00827 0.00827 0.00827 0.00827 0.00827 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
divsep -0.529*** -0.529*** -0.529*** -0.529*** -0.529*** 
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 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
widowed 0.0466 0.0466 0.0466 0.0466 0.0466 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Lag-
unemployed 0.0908** 0.0908** 0.0908** 0.0908** 0.0908** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
# of kids 0.0490** 0.0490** 0.0490** 0.0490** 0.0490** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
household size -0.0430** -0.0430** -0.0430** -0.0430** -0.0430** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant 1.011*** 0.205 -0.790*** -2.085*** -3.566*** 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Obs 23712 23712 23712 23712 23712 
Log-L -30469     
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: coefficients on time dummies and regional dummies not reported 
 
 
 
